Can a trifle gain to sufficiently many well-off justify imposing a much larger sacrifice on the worst-off? We show that if one answers negatively to such a question, one is forced to accept the maximin principle and give full priority to the worst-off even when a trifle gain to the worst-off imposes a substantial sacrifice on arbitrarily many well-off. If one dislikes this consequence, one faces a real dilemma in choosing between the tyranny of aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation.
Introduction
The maximin principle of Rawls (1971) is widely considered implausible as a principle of justice, because it implies that we give absolute priority to the worst-off individual in all situations. Harsanyi (1975) provides the following example in support of his rejection of the maximin principle: 'For example, let us assume that society would consist of a large number of individuals, of whom one would be seriously retarded. Suppose that some extremely expensive treatment were to become available, which could very slightly improve the retarded individual's condition, but at such high costs that this treatment could be financed only if some of the most brilliant individuals were deprived of all higher education. The difference principle would require that the retarded individual should all the same receive this very expensive treatment at any event -no matter how many people would have to be denied a higher education, and no matter how strongly they would desire to obtain one.' (p. 597). We may name this the tyranny of non-aggregation. On the basis of this kind of argument, economists and philosophers have been attracted by utilitarian and, more recently, "prioritarian" (i.e. generalized utilitarian) criteria (for a discussion of this literature, see Tungodden, 2003) . However, these approaches have very counterintuitive implications. Scanlon (1998) provides an example: 'Suppose that Jones has suffered an accident in the transmitter room of a television station. Electrical equipment has fallen on his arm, and we cannot rescue him without turning off the transmitter for fifteen minutes. A World Cup match is in progress, watched by many people, and it will not be over for an hour. Jones's injury will not get any worse if we wait, but his hand has been mashed and he is receiving extremely painful electrical shocks. Should we rescue him now or wait until the match is over? Does the right thing to do depend on how many people are watching -whether it is one million or five million or a hundred million? It seems to me that we should not wait, no matter how many viewers there are...' (p. 235). Both utilitarian and prioritarian reasoning would support the conclusion that for a sufficiently large number of viewers, the right thing to do would be not to turn off the transmitter before the match is over. We may name this the tyranny of aggregation.
In this paper, we consider the possibility of avoiding both the tyranny of non-aggregation and the tyranny of aggregation. We provide an example of a continuous social ordering function that does so. Our main result, however, shows that all such examples violate a basic consistency requirement, and thus that there is no attractive solution to this dilemma.
Section 2 provides the basic framework, and we present the results in Section 3 and some concluding remarks in Section 4. In the appendix, we present an alternative formulation of our impossibility result.
Framework and basic axioms
Let Z ++ be the set of positive integers, and also the set of potential individuals. A particular population is N ⊂ Z ++ , N 6 = ∅. Let N be the set of non-empty finite subsets of Z ++ with at least two elements. An individual is i ∈ N , and we use the notation N − i = N \ {i}. Let |N | denote the cardinality of N.
An allocation is x = (x i ) i∈N ∈ R N + , where x i is i's utility. We assume that utilities are fully interpersonally comparable, which implies that no social orderings are excluded from the analysis because of informational constraints. We apply the notation
The subsets of worst-off and best-off individuals are defined as follows.
A preordering is a reflexive and transitive binary relation. An ordering is a complete preordering. A social preordering (resp., ordering) function R defines a preordering (resp., ordering) R N over R N + for every N ∈ N . Let P N denote the corresponding strict preference relation: x P N y if and only if x R N y and not y R N x. We now list basic requirements that will be imposed on social (pre)ordering functions. First, we have the standard Pareto principle.
In the analysis, we also apply the stronger version of the Pareto principle and a continuity requirement.
Continuity For all N ∈ N , all x ∈ R N + , the sets
We also introduce the following basic consistency requirement, that says that removing someone who opposes an alternative, or adding someone who supports it, does not make it less attractive.
An impossibility theorem
The aim of the analysis is to study the possibility of avoiding the tyranny of aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation. Formally speaking, this implies that the social (pre)ordering function needs to satisfy the following two conditions. First, Minimal Aggregation states that if all individuals, except one, gain sufficiently, then it is tolerable to impose a loss on the remaining individual if the loss is sufficiently small.
Second, Minimal Non-Aggregation states that if the worst-off gains, there is a sufficiently small loss that is tolerable for all the best-off, no matter how numerous they are.
(ii) for all j ∈ N − i such that x j 6 = y j , j ∈ B(x) ∩ B(y), y j ≥ r and
To appreciate the weakness of this condition, let us emphasize that the admissible loss to the best-off may be arbitrarily small. Note also that this quantity may depend on the levels of the worst-off's and the best-off's utility. In particular, one can imagine that, for a given gain to the worst-off, the size of the admissible loss to the best-off is decreasing in the worst-off's utility and increasing in the best-off's utility.
The question we want to address is whether there exists a social (pre)ordering function that satisfies both conditions. As a preliminary result, we observe that there exist continuous and Paretian social ordering functions that avoid both the tyranny of aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation.
Proposition 1 There exist social ordering functions that satisfy Strong Pareto, Continuity, Minimal Aggregation, and Minimal Non-Aggregation.
Proof. The Geometric Gini social ordering functions satisfy all these conditions. They are defined as follows: For any N ∈ N and x, y ∈ R
where x (k) is the kth component by increasing order, and a > 1. It is clear that every member of this family satisfies Strong Pareto, Continuity and Minimal Aggregation. Let us prove that it also satisfies Minimal Non-Aggregation. Consider any a > 1 and any q, r ≥ 0, α > 0. Let β < min{α, α(a − 1)}. Consider any N ∈ N , x, y ∈ R N + , and i ∈ N such that:
(ii) for all j ∈ N − i such that x j 6 = y j , j ∈ B(x) ∩ B(y), y j ≥ r and y j − x j ≤ β. We have to prove that x R N y. One has
We know that x (1) − y (1) ≥ α and for all k = 2, ..., |N | ,
Now, for a > 1,
and the latter inequality is true because
Therefore,
which means that x R N y.
However, it turns out that the Geometric Gini does not satisfy our consistency requirement. To illustrate, consider the case where a = 2, with the allocations x = (5, 5, 5), y = (3, 6, 10), z = (5, 5), w = (3, 10). In this case, the Geometric Gini deems that x is better than y, whereas w is better than z. The only difference between the comparison of z and w and x and y is that we have removed a person who is better-off in y than in x. Because we consider x to be better than y, Reinforcement therefore requires that we should also consider z at least as good as w.
More generally, it turns out that it is not possible to combine Reinforcement with our two minimal conditions, even if we relax the Pareto principle and drop the requirements of continuity and completeness. To see this, let us first establish the following lemma, which is also of some interest in itself as a characterization of the strict preference part of the maximin criterion.
Lemma 1 If a social preordering function R satisfies Weak Pareto, Reinforcement and Minimal Non-Aggregation, then for all N ∈ N and all x, y ∈ R N + , if min i∈N x i > min i∈N y i , then x P N y.
Proof. Consider any N ∈ N and x, y ∈ R N + such that min i∈N x i > min i∈N y i . We will now prove that x P N y. Step 1. If min i∈N x i > max i∈N y i , then x P N y follows from Weak Pareto. Hence, in the rest of the proof we assume that min i∈N x i ≤ max i∈N y i , where i 0 refers to some person who has y i 0 = min i∈N y i .
Step 2. Define y * , x * , x * * * such that:
and let 0 < β 2 < α 2 < x * * * − x * be corresponding terms for the application of Minimal Non-Aggregation at q = x * and r = x * * * . Then pick x * * ∈ (x * , x * * * ) such that x * * − x * ≥ α 2 and x * * * − x * * ≤ β 2 . Let γ 2 = x * * * − x * * and α 1 be such that:
It then follows that x * * * > x * * + γ 2 10 + α 1 . Pick some 0 < β 1 < α 1 to satisfy Minimal Non-Aggregation given α 1 and for q = x * * + γ 2 10 and r = x * * + γ 2 10 + α 1 . It then follows straightforwardly that there exist γ 1 ∈ (0, β 1 ) and m ∈ Z ++ such that:
Let M ∈ N be such that |M | = m, M ∩N = ∅, and let M k = {m (1), ..., m(k)} denote the subset of M containing the first k members. Consider now the following allocations:
).
By (1) and Weak Pareto,z
By Minimal Non-Aggregation,ẑ
(because there is a worst-off who remains the worst-off and gains α 1 inẑ 1 compared toz 1 and all the people who lose are best-off in both alternatives and lose γ 1 which is less than β 1 ; recall that α 1 , β 1 have been chosen to satisfy Minimal Non-Aggregation for q = x * * + γ 2 10 and r = x * * + γ 2 10 + α 1 -by (3) the latter is less than the best-off's utility inz 1 , i.e., y * ). Hence, by transitivity,
Step 3. Consider now the sequence z t ,z t ,ẑ t , for all t = 2, ..., m, defined as follows:
In particular, this definition implies that everyone in M t is indifferent between z t andz t , except for the worst-off who gains α 1 :
By Minimal Non-Aggregation, for all t = 2, ..., m,
(because there is a worst-off who remains the worst-off and gains α 1 inẑ t compared toz t and all the people who lose are best-off in both alternatives, by (3), and lose γ 1 which is less than β 1 ; recall that α 1 , β 1 have been chosen to satisfy Minimal Non-Aggregation for q = x * * + γ 2 10 and r = x * * + γ 2 10 + α 1 -the former is greater than the worst-off's utility inz t , i.e., x * * +
, and by (3) the latter is less than the best-off's utility inz t , i.e., y * − (t − 1)γ 1 ). Pick t ∈ {2, ..., m} . Ifẑ t−1 P N −i0∪Mt−1 z t−1 , then by Reinforcement,
and z
By
Step 2, a recursive argument applies and therefore this holds true for all t = 2, ..., m. In particular, one has:
Step 4. Considerz m = (x * * * , ..., x * * * | {z }
By (3) and Weak Pareto,z m P N−i0∪Mmẑm .
Hence, by
Step 3 and transitivity,
Step 5. Consider:
),
.
Step 4 and Reinforcement,w Recall that γ 2 = x * * * − x * * . One then has,
Consider:
By Minimal Non-Aggregation,
(because there is a worst-off who remains the worst-off, by (4) , and gains x * * − x * ≥ α 2 in z * compared tow m and all the people who lose are best-off in both alternatives and lose δ < γ 2 = x * * * − x * * ≤ β 2 ; recall that α 2 , β 2 have been chosen to satisfy Minimal Non-Aggregation for q = x * and r = x * * * ). Hence, by Step 5 and transitivity,
Step 7. By Step 6, (4) and Reinforcement,
By the fact that min i∈N x i > x * * * > x * * and Weak Pareto,
Hence, by transitivity, We can now establish our main result. Proof. This directly follows from the fact that the maximin property obtained in Lemma 1 is incompatible with Minimal Aggregation.
The theorem shows that it is not possible to avoid both the tyranny of aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation in social choices. Note that all four conditions are needed in order to establish the impossibility result, as illustrated by General Indifference (violating Weak Pareto), Geometric Gini (violating Reinforcement), Utilitarianism (violating Minimal Non-Aggregation), and Maximin (violating Minimal Aggregation).
1 A variant of the result, which relies on another consistency condition (Replication Invariance) and a slightly stronger version of Minimal Non-Aggregation, is presented in the appendix.
Concluding remarks
The main result of this paper implies that there is a real dilemma in social choices. No consistent criterion avoids both the tyranny of aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation. Given that we find both the tyranny of aggregation and the tyranny of non-aggregation to be disturbing, we believe that one should be cautious when criticizing maximin, (generalized) utilitarianism or any other social ordering on the basis of how they perform in extreme cases. The assessment of the various possible social ordering functions should be more comprehensive and, maybe, more focused on cases that are directly relevant to actual policy issues.
We first note that there exist social ordering functions that satisfy Replication Invariance in combination with the other three conditions of our theorem.
Proposition 2 There exist social ordering functions that satisfy Strong Pareto, Replication Invariance, Minimal Aggregation, and Minimal Non-Aggregation.
The following social ordering function satisfies all the conditions: For all N ∈ N and x, y ∈ R N + , x R N y iff min i∈N x i +x ≥ min i∈N y i +ȳ.
However, it turns out that the impossibility reemerges if we slightly strengthen Minimal Non-Aggregation. The strengthened version allows for the possibility that there may be more than one worst-off person in y, which implies that the worst-off person in y may no longer be the worst-off person in x. However, it is still required that it is not among the best-off in x.
Minimal Non-Aggregation* For all q, r ≥ 0, α > 0, there is 0 < β < α such that for all N ∈ N , all x, y ∈ R N + , all i ∈ N, if (i) i ∈ W (y) \ B(x), y i ≤ q and x i − y i ≥ α; (ii) for all j ∈ N − i such that x j 6 = y j , j ∈ B(x) ∩ B(y), y j ≥ r and y j − x j ≤ β, then x R N y.
We can now establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If a social preordering function R satisfies Weak Pareto, Replication Invariance and Minimal Non-Aggregation * , then for all N ∈ N and all x, y ∈ R N + , if min i∈N x i > min i∈N y i , then x P N y.
Proof. Consider any N ∈ N and x, y ∈ R N + such that min i∈N x i > min i∈N y i . We will now prove that x P N y. Step 1. If min i∈N x i > max i∈N y i , then x P N y follows from Weak Pareto. Hence, in the rest of the proof, we assume that min i∈N x i ≤ max i∈N y i , with i 0 referring to some person who has y i 0 = min i∈N y i .
Step 2. Choose x * , x * * , y * such that:
min i∈N x i > x * * > x * > min i∈N y i , and y * > max i∈N y i . Define α = x * * − x * and let β be the corresponding term for Minimal Non-Aggregation * at q = x * and r = x * * . Let 0 < γ < β and m ∈ Z ++ be such that: min i∈N x i > y * − mγ > x * * .
Finally, define the allocations z
